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THE  IDRATOM  SAFEGUARDS  SYST]M 
In 1957,  six European countries had established the EUropean Atomic  Energy  Community 
(EURATOM).  The  task of the  Community,  in accordance with art.  1  of the Euratom  Treaty, 
is "to contribute to the raising of the  standard of living in the Member  States and 
to  the development of relations with the other countries by creating the  conditions 
necessary for the  speedy establishment and  growth of nuclear industries". 
The  Treaty contains Chapter VII,  Safeguards,  by which the first multinational nuclear 
safeguards  system was  established.  Thus,  the  signatory states handed  over the controls 
for nuclear safeguards within its own  territory to the  Community  executive body,  the 
Commission.  The  Commission,  therefore,  has the right to control stocks and flow  of 
fissile material within the territory of the Member  States. However,  if an  infraction 
of safeguards  is detected  law  enforcement  measures  remain the task of the  individual 
member  countries.  On  January lst 1973  the  Community  was  enlarged by three  New  Member 
States, all of whom  accepted these  safeguard measures as full members  of Euratom. 
Application of Safeguards  in the Fuel  Cycle within the Community 
The  Euratom  safeguard system has been  in operation for almost  twenty years during 
which  time  it has proved  its effectiveness. Its task is to verify non-diversion, 
and  to maintain control over the use  to which nuclear material  is put  for all non-
military purposes. 
Euratom  safeguards apply not  only to all civil nuclear materials  in the Member  States 
of the European  Community  but also to  equipment  and  non  nuclear materials for use 
in nuclear installations supplied by separate agreements  with third countries,  if 
such  agreement  so  require. 
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11  In contrast with the situation in almost all other parts  of the world,  the 
Corr~unity has  nuclear installations of practically all types,  gas  graphite 
reactors,  li~1t-water reactors,  research and  experimental reactors,  high-
temperature gas  reactors,  fast  reactors  and  the related enrichment,  fabri-
cation and  reprocessing facilities.  They use natural,  slightly-enriched and 
highly enriched  ur~~ium and  plutonium.  In terms  of numbers  of installations, 
in 1976  there were  in the  Community: 
35  preparation and fabrication plants 
71  power reactors 
117  research  reactors 
13  reprocessing plants 
211  research centres,  laboratories,  stores,  enrichment 
plants,  others. 
To  give  some  idea of the  extent of nuclear activity within the  Community 
in 1976,  the  number  of movements  of fissile material among  nuclear plants 
in the  Corr~unity were  as  follows: 
5.000 for material less than  1  kg of weight 
8.000 for material more  than 1  kg of \.'Ieight. 
The  nurr.ber  of nuclear packages  imported in the  same  period amounted  to 568; 
the  number  of exports to 508. 
~  The  figures  give an idea of the  importance  and  complexity of nuclear acti  vi-
ties in the  Community  to WLich  the Euratom  inspectors  have  been applying a 
detailed and  efficient system of safeguards  since 1959. 
The  Euratom Safeguards  Department  has  115  staff members  of whom  about  60  are 
safeguards  inspectors,  drawL  from  all nine  ~;:ember States of the  Ccmmuni ty. 
They  are permanent European civil servru1ts  and are therefore responsible 
towards  the Commission  and  not  to\-Iards  their country of origir.:.. 
Hith regard to accountancy,  about  20.000  entry lines are processed  p~r month 
from  the 450  installations. Electronic data processing has  been adopted and 
the  computerized system has  reduced the effort for book-keeping and  checking 
very considerably.  Inconsistencies are automatically detected.  The  controls 
effected by  Euratom are based  on  declarations made  by  each  operator on  the 
amount  and q1ali  ty  (enrichment)  of the nuclear material being moved  from  pl~1 
to plan in dynamic  flow  as  well as static (inventory)  conditions. Fissile 
material is measured at the time  of  e11try  and exit.  Inventories are taken 
periodically and  declared by the operators:  the declarations and  the 
measurement  systems  of the operators are checked  one  against the other by 
the Euratom control department. 
In order to save  as  much  as  possible  on  inspection effort,  full  accou..Ylt  is 
taken of the fact that  each installation is linked with  a  preceding and  a 
subsequent  installation within the cycle. - 3 -
In the  course of inspection special attention is paid to plutonium and  1J 
highly enriched uranium at points in the fuel  cycle where  transformations 
involve possible losses of material,  such as  fuel  element  fabrication plants 
or where  some  uncertainty in the amount  of material assessed may  still exist, 
such as  reprocessing facilities. 
To  give  a  better understanding of the v1ay  in which  safeguards  are applied, 
an  example  is given o:f  the procedure  followed  in a  generic plant for fuel 
element  fabrication. 
Flow  verification 
~~eip!~: 
The  verification of the input material is done  by non-destructive techniques 
or by  taking samples  for analysis at the  same  time that  commercial  samples 
are taken,  and by weighing.  Quite  often the verification of the  materic~l has 
been made  at the dispatching installation. In this case the shipping 
containers  are sealed before dispatch and at the  receiving plant  only Ghecks 
on  seals are carried out. 
~ispatch~: 
If the plarrl  proceeds to undertake destructive analysis  and weight  or 110lume 
measurements  of material before the final stage of the fabrication,  a  direct 
check of those measurements  is performed by the Safeguards  Inspectors. 
If the plant proceeds  to undertake measurements  of material  content  in the 
finished fuel  by non-destructive assay  (1~A) techniques,  the precision and 
accuracy of measurement  is verified by use of reference materials  relating 
to the production.  Special attention is given to the preparation of these 
reference materials which must  comply with the  requirements  of the  SafE~­
guards Authorities  and  also be  recognized by  the plant  operators  as  reference 
elements  representative of the production. 
In cases v1here  the plant does  not  proceed to undertake  NDA  measurements  and 
the use of these techniques  is possible,  this verification is carried out by 
the Safeguard Authorities using their own  equipment  and their own  reference 
standards. 
~iaste: 
In this case NDA  techniques are used by the plant  and  checked by the Safe-
guards Directorate against  calibration curves. 
Taking of the  inventory 
The  date and  the procedure for taking the inventory,  which is done at least 
once  or  t~'lice  a  year depending on  the amount  and  quality of material he:ld, 
have to be declared by the operators.  To  give the Safeguards Directorate 
the possibility of carrying out its verification,  a  physical  inve~tory list 
is made  available to the Safeguards Directorate.  This list serves as  a  basis 
for preparing the overall plan of the verification including sampling plans 
and  the use of NDA  equipment. - 4-
Jr  Safeguards Directorate liDA  Instruments 
In order to increase the efficiency of the verifications,  ~~ratom inspectors 
are increasingly making use of 1mA  techniques.  To  this effect Safeguards 
Directorate  equipment has been installed in several plants and,  when  appro-
priate, portable  instruments are taken and used by the  inspectors.  To  give 
some  examples: 
Gamma  scanners  equipped tvi th Nai  and  Ge  (Li) detectors  connected to analy-
sers  and minicomputers,  have  been installed in fabrication plants and  are 
used to measure fuel  elements  and plates of enriched uranium and  plutonium 
pins. 
A  "Ra...."ldom  Driver" is used for  ~cti  ve  or passive neutron measurements  of 
uranium and  plutonium  scrap~ • 
An  instrument,  based on neutron interrogation,  has ·been  installed in a 
fabrication  pl~"lt to measure HTR  fuel  pebbles. 
Portable 256-channel  analysers  and  Sam  2  equipment  are used to measure 
different material quantities through their emission of gammas  and  neutro~. 
- I~eutron coincidence  counters for the  control of plutonium scraps  and  mixed 
U-Pu  pins are in some  cases  i~stalled in the plants,  other3  are brought 
into the plants by a  specially equipped carrier which is also the property 
of the Safeguards Directorate. 
A minicomputer is used in particular to verify the physical  inventory taken 
by the plant  operators. 
~It is clear that  for the application of safeguards,  the  choice  of points  in 
the fuel  cycle,  the selection of points  in the plants,  the type  of instru-
mentation most  suitable for  each application,  require  thoro~gh a~alysis of 
the fuel  cycle in general  and its components,  careful study of the  equipment 
required in each case,  selection of techniques  to be used,  etc. 
For every situation,  the effectiveness and  accuracy of safeguards must  be 
assured,  'w.rhile  keeping costs  and  burdens for the operator to a  minimum. 
A programme  of R and D has been developed by the Commission's  Joint  Research 
Centre together tvi th special support activities designed to solve specific 
cases  ~vhich may  be  encountered by the Safeguards Directorate during its nor-
mal  safeguards activities. 
EURATOM  - .AEA  Ag-reement 
In April 1973,  the  Community,  seven of its Member  States and  the  IAEA  signed 
a  safeguards  agreement  pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
nuclear Heapo:n.s.  This agreement,  meantime  is in force  and  the Euratom  and 
IAEA  Safeguards  organizations are  engaged  in roexercise with the aims  of 
harmonizing their activities in such a  way  that the duties and  responsibi-
lities of each can be faithfully carried out. 5 -
Under  this Agreement  the inventory of nuclear materials in the signatory  1J 
Member  States as  of the a3-lhFebruary  1977  has  been transmitted to  IAEA,  which 
is now  regularly informed of all nuclear material stocks  arrl movements  into 
and  out  of installations in these States. Many  inspections by  I~~A for veri-
fication of the initial inventory and  for design information verification have 
been carried out  since then at the  sa..rne  time  as Euratom  inspections are 
being performed.  Studies are being made  based  on  the knowledge  and  experience 
of Euratom  in applying safeguards  at their facilities to determine the 
optimum  techniques  and procedures  for future  routine application.  Confidence 
exists  that  an efficient method  of working together between the  Community 
and third countries in nuclear safeguards  can be  achieved. 
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